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In this paper, we gather together the minimum units of Bitcoin identity (the individual
addresses), and group them into approximations of business entities, what we call “super
clusters”. While these clusters can remain largely anonymous, we are able to ascribe many
of them to particular business categories by analyzing some of their specific transaction
patterns, as observed during the period from 2009-2015. We are then able to extract and
create a map of the network of payment relationships among them, and analyze transaction
behavior found in each business category. We conclude by identifying three marked regimes
that have evolved as the Bitcoin economy has grown and matured: from an early prototype
stage; to a second growth stage populated in large part with “sin” enterprise (i.e., gambling,
black markets); to a third stage marked by a sharp progression away from “sin” and toward
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1 Introduction
The data reveal that the number of transactions on the Bitcoin blockchain rose expo-
nentially from around 1,000 per day in 2011 to around 300,000 per day at the moment
of writing.1 At the current exchange rate the notional value of daily transaction volume
ranges between $200 and $300 million.2 Thus, it becomes appropriate to explore how the
Bitcoin economy is populated and extract the map of payment relationships, as well as
to trace the evolution of those relationships over time. This paper takes that direction
by identifying the interconnection between the economic agents that use the Bitcoin pay-
ment network to transfer the digital currency among each other. In particular, we start
by clustering the minimum units of Bitcoin identity, which are the individual “addresses”,
into what we call “super clusters”, and then we tag those clusters using de-anonymized
addresses. A super cluster can be thought of as an approximation of a business entity
in that it describes a group of addresses that are owned or controlled collectively for
some particular economic purpose by the same entity.3 Although the exact identities
of super clusters can remain unknown, we are able to allocate many of them to specific
business categories (namely to exchange, mining pool, online gambling, black market, or
composite) by analyzing some of their specific transaction patterns, as observed during
the period from 2009-2015.4 With that information, we unveil and study the Bitcoin net-
work of payment relationships both among super clusters and between them with other
clusters in broader business categories (traders, gamblers, black market user-dealers, oth-
ers, individuals or unknown). In doing so, we are subsequently able to identify three
distinct regimes that have existed in the Bitcoin economy’s growth and development.
Namely, a “proof of concept” or “mining-dominated” phase, a “sin” or “gambling/black
market-dominated” phase, and a “maturation” or “exchange-dominated” phase.
1By convention we use Bitcoin with a capital ’B’ to denote the protocol, network, and community,
while bitcoin with a small ’b’ denotes the digital currency and units of that currency.
2See Blockchain (2015a).
3In principle, a single entity may have control over more than one distinct super cluster if the common
ownership of some of their addresses is not evident from the data.
4The category ”composite” represents clusters that are identified as having a mix of more than one
defined business activity.
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It is possible to map some of the activity and interaction among Bitcoin users because
pseudonimity, rather than strict anonymity, is a remarkable characteristic of the Bitcoin
network, see e.g., Reid and Harrigan (2013). As such, the identities of users are hidden
behind their addresses that work as a pseudonyms, but which may be revealed upon
transacting with somebody else.5 In other words, if Alice remits payment to Bob, then
their identities will be revealed to one another by virtue of exchanging addresses to send
or receive bitcoin.
The novelty of our study is to elaborate and propose a general de-anonymization
method that allows us to link some large clusters, including groups of addresses, to
particular business categories. Furthermore, we map the network of payment relationships
of these clusters and subsequently describe three distinct regimes within the Bitcoin
economy.
There are two general procedures that have been proposed thus far to solve the prob-
lem of de-anonymizing Bitcoin addresses:“clustering” and “labeling”. Clustering consists
of grouping together in one unique cluster all the addresses that belong to the same ben-
eficial owner (i.e., legal or individual person). This approach requires one to apply either
the “input address heuristic” and/or the “change address heuristic.”6 After clustering,
one can apply labeling which consists of either: 1) manually tagging Bitcoin addresses to
specific entities by directly participating in Bitcoin transactions with those entities;7 or
5A Bitcoin address is an identifier of 26-35 alphanumeric characters that is derived from the public
key through the use of one-way cryptographic hashing. The algorithms used to make a Bitcoin address
from a public key are the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) and the RACE Integrity Primitives Evaluation
Message Digest (RIPEMD), specifically SHA256 and RIPEMD160, see e.g., Antonopoulos (2014).
6In the Bitcoin network, the output of a transaction is used as the input of another transaction. If
the input is larger than the new transaction output the client generates a new Bitcoin address, and sends
the difference back to this address. This is known as change. From the Bitcoin wiki: Take the case
of the transaction 0a1c0b1ec0ac55a45b1555202daf2e08419648096f5bcc4267898d420dffef87, a 10.89 BTC
previously unspent output was spent by the client. 10 BTC was the payment amount, and 0.89 BTC
was the amount of change returned. The client can’t spend just 10.00 BTC out of a 10.89 BTC payment
anymore than a person can spend $1 out of a $20 bill. The entire 10.89 BTC unspent output became
the input of this new transaction and in the process produced are two new unspent outputs which have
a combined value of 10.89 BTC. The 10.89 BTC is now ”spent” and effectively destroyed because the
network will prevent it from ever being spent again. Those unspent outputs can now become inputs for
future transactions
7This is a very time consuming and inefficient activity, e.g., Meiklejohn et al. (2013) by participating
in 344 transactions was able to manually tag 1,017.
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2) extracting information from specific web pages in which, for any reason, the identity
of Bitcoin addresses’ holders is public and can be extracted.
According to the input address heuristic, addresses used as inputs either synchronously
in the same multi-input transactions or asynchronously in different multi-input transac-
tions (when at least one input address is in common), are grouped together in clusters.
In other words, if address x and address y are both inputs of a transaction, then we
assume address x and y belong to the same cluster. Furthermore, if both address y and
address z belong to another transaction, we would extrapolate that address x, y and z
are all belonging to the same cluster. Already Nakamoto (2008) indirectly recognize the
power of the input address method by saying that, “[...] some linking is still unavoidable
with multi-input transactions, which necessarily reveal that their inputs were owned by the
same owner. The risk is that if the owner of a key is revealed, linking could reveal other
transactions that belonged to the same owner”. Later, Ron and Shamir (2013) extensively
discuss the input address method and applied it via the “Union-Find graph algorithm” in
a study of the Bitcoin network through the 13th of May, 2012. Within the group of this
heuristic, other works including Spagnuolo (2013) and Doll et al. (2014) try to provide
some practical applications of the theory by developing front–end web services to show
in real-time the cluster id correspondent to a specific address query. In particular, Spag-
nuolo (2013) proposes the BitIodine tool which parses the blockchain, clusters addresses
that are likely to belong to a same user or group of users, classifies such users and labels
them, and finally visualizes complex information extracted from the Bitcoin network.
With regard to the change address heuristic, a cluster is composed of the input ad-
dresses plus the output addresses that are predicted to be change addresses. A first
proposal of this heuristic comes from Androulaki et al. (2013) which naively assumes
that “[...] in the current Bitcoin implementation, users rarely issue transactions to two
different users”. Presumably this assumption did once hold in the past but it is not
holding true any longer. Therefore, this first version of the change address heuristic is
relatively fragile compared to the input address heuristic, and aggressive implementa-
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tions require large amounts of hand tuning to prevent false positives.8 Meiklejohn et al.
(2013) reevaluates the change address heuristic and applies it cautiously by identifying
only one-time change addresses under the following conditions: 1) the transaction is not
a coin generation; 2) it is the first appearance of the address and this is not the case for
other output addresses (i.e., all the other addresses has been previously used); and 3)
there is no other address in the output that is the same as the input address (i.e., no self-
change address). The assumption behind this version of the change address heuristic is
that the change address is one newly generated by the user’s wallet; even the owner may
not acknowledge its existence. In contrast, the receiver’s address is usually determined
in advance and notified to the sender. Thus, also the one-time change address requires
significant human adjustment to avoid excessive false positives when: 1) the receiver is a
new user or creates a new address never used before; 2) the transaction output has two
receivers’ addresses without change address; 3) the sender uses an old address to receive
change, or there is no change transaction at all. Despite some studies that rely on this
version of the change address heuristic, e.g., Garcia et al. (2014), for the purpose of our
study we opt for the input address heuristic. Although this method is subject to some
false negatives because it considers eligible for clustering only the addresses being used
as transaction inputs, it is nonetheless robust because it is not subject to false positives.
In fact, any false positive would compromise the result of the pattern analysis applied to
ascribe the clusters to particular business categories; in such a case, the clusters them-
selves would be composed of wrong addresses that would likely follow incorrect behavioral
patterns.
However, false positives could become a problem with the introduction, since 2013,
of the coinjoin practice, see e.g., Kristov Atlas (2015) and Tasca (2015). Coinjoin trans-
actions are one example of a tool used to further anonymize transactions within a dis-
tributed ledger. The principle behind this method is quite simple: If for example, Alice
wants to send one bitcoin to Bob, and Carla wants to send one bitcoin to David, a coin-
8A false positive exists when an address is wrongly included in a cluster (i.e., all addresses are not
controlled by the same entity), and a false negative when an address should be in a cluster but is not.
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join transaction could be established whereby the addresses of Alice and Carla are both
listed as inputs, and the addresses of Bob and David are listed as outputs in one unique
transaction. Thus, when inspecting the 2-to-2 transaction from outside it is impossible
to discern who is the sender and who the recipient. In our example, we cannot tell if it
is Bob or David who is the recipient of Alice. If this simplified principle were the actual
implementation of coinjoin, then obviously the input address method could mistakenly
cluster together the addresses of Alice and Carla as if they belonged to the same entity.
However, in practice a coinjoin transaction works in a slightly different way. Indeed,
the coinjoin service providers not only shuﬄe the addresses of the users but they also
create new batches of addresses that are then added to the users’ addresses and mixed
together in the transactions. In our observations, coinjoin addresses could be reused for
several times with many other addresses from different users. Thus, new unknown large
clusters are created that do not belong to any precise business category because their
adresses are very likely linked to more than two distinct entities or directly to coinjoin
service providers. Those clusters are similar to “black holes” as they “absorb” addresses
that should have been enclosed in other clusters with a clear business profile. To conclude,
even in the presence of coinjoin transactions, our method is robust because the likelihood
of encountering false positives is practically negligible.
The result of applying the input address heuristic returns more than 30 million clus-
ters, which reduces to a more manageable 2,850 when considering only those composed
of at least one hundred addresses and that have received at least one thousand bitcoins
from January 2009 through May 2015. As mentioned at the beginning, we label such
clusters as super clusters because they represent big agents with strong presence and
intense activity in the Bitcoin economy. All together, those super clusters received tens
of $ billions over the study period, at the current exchange rate.
We acknowledge that it is practically impossible to correctly identify all the 2,850
super clusters in the sample. Moreover, our study has the less ambitious aim to ascribe
all super clusters to a given broader business category and explore their network of
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business relationships. Therefore, from a list of publicly available pre-identified addresses
obtained from the Internet we successfully identify 209 super clusters out of 2,850. This
subset of known clusters, called the “known group”, is used as the benchmark to identify
the business category of the remaining 2,641 clusters in the “unknown group”.
We conclude our study by unveiling the network of payment relationship between
these 2,850 super clusters and by exploring the relative interdependence among business
categories, as well as their evolution over the study period.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section [2] introduces some preliminary definitions;
Section [3] describes the data set we draw upon; Section [4] introduces pure user group
(PUG) analysis to classify super clusters in the unknown group; Section [5] presents a
transaction pattern (TP) analysis, examining inflows and outflows among those super
clusters in known group; Section [6] backtests the results from the PUG analysis; and
Section [7] describes the network of entities on the Bitcoin network as discerned from
the PUG and TP analyzes and develops the progression of three regimes of the Bitcoin
economy.
2 Preliminary Definitions
As explained in Section 1, the building block of our analysis is the concept of clustering
Bitcoin addresses. In this section we provide a formal definition of clustering by omitting
unnecessary technical information which may turn out to be redundant and therefore not
useful for the scope of our analysis.
We define the set Tx of all the Bitcoin transactions, occurred during the period of
our analysis, as Tx = (tx1, ..., txi, ..., txz). To each element txi of Tx corresponds the
cluster set ci = (a1, a2, ...an)i containing all the input addresses (a1, a2, ...) used in the
transaction txi. By using a variant of a Union-Find graph algorithm (Cormen et al.,
2009), if two or more clusters directly or indirectly (via other clusters) have at least one
address in common, we merge those clusters into a single unique one. At the end of
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the merging process, we get C = {c1, ..., cx, ..., cy, ..., cz} which is the set of all disjoint
clusters such that cx ∩ cy = ∅ for all cx, cy ∈ C. Let W (C) be a finite set W (C) =
{wxy(cx, cy) | cx, cy ∈ C, cx 6= cy} ∪ {wxx(cx, cx) | ∀cx ∈ C}. Then, W ⊆ W (C) is the set
of all (direct) transaction (with loops9) between clusters, where wxy is the total quantity
of bitcoins transferred from cluster cx to cluster cy:
wxy =

wxy if there is a transation from cx to cy.
0 otherwise.






whx(ch, cx) ≥ 1, 000 BTC ∧ n(cx) ≥ 100
}
. (1)
where n(cx) denotes the number of addresses in cluster x.
According to our definition, a super cluster is any cluster that satisfies the following
two thresholds: 1) having received at least 1, 000 bitcoins during our research window;
and 2) is composed of at least 100 unique addresses.
The first threshold is necessary in order to increase the likelihood of excluding inactive
entities from the analysis. The second threshold is necessary to exclude as many private
individuals as possible, who typically own only one or a few addresses. Together, these
thresholds increase the robustness of the transaction pattern analysis of the clusters in
Section [5], which is based on statistics requiring big enough data. In fact, smaller clusters
composed of some tens, or even some hundreds of addresses are only able to generate
a trivial amount of transaction data, giving us insufficient information to perform a
meaningful analysis.
9Indeed, fork-merge patterns and self loops represent a frequent scenario in the Bitcoin economy, e.g.,
Tasca (2015) and Ron and Shamir (2013).
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3 Data Set
In our study we parsed data from the Bitcoin Core over the period of the 3rd of January
2009 (block 0) through the 8th of May 2015 (block 355551).10 Over this interval, the
Bitcoin network proliferates both in terms of number of addresses and in terms of number
of transactions. See Table 1 for a summary of our data set. All the data related to Bitcoin
transactions are imported into and managed via a MySQL database (see the diagram in
Figure 14 in Appendix A).
Bitcoin Core parsed from the 3rd of January 2009 until 8th of May 2015
Max block height 355,551
Total number of transactions 68,030,042
Total number of input 172,743,139
Total number of output 194,476,567
Total addresses identified 75,191,953
Total clusters identified(include at least one address) 30,708,660
Number of clusters with at least 2 addresses 9,847,999
Total transactions between clusters 88,950,021
Table 1: Blockchain Database Facts. Source: Bitcoin Core.
By applying the input address heuristic, 75,191,953 unique Bitcoin addresses are
grouped into 30,708,660 clusters, of which, about two-thirds are clusters composed of
only a single address, as shown in Table 2.
10Bitcoin Core was, by far, the most dominant version of the Bitcoin blockchain over the study period.
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Input Address Heuristic: Clustering Result
Number of addresses included in each cluster Number of clusters identified
> 10001 194
1001∼10000 1,145
101 ∼ 1000 12,185
11∼100 436,093
2 ∼ 10 9,398,382
=1 20,860,661
Total number of clusters 30,708,660
Table 2: The clusters identified with the input address heuristic are grouped per number of addresses
composing them. Source: Bitcoin Core.
Then, by applying the criteria defined in Equation (1), 2,850 super clusters are filtered
out. Figure 1 shows the network of super clusters Cˆ and their transactions among each
other, as well as with all the remaining clusters in C \ Cˆ.
By gathering publicly available address information, we are able to link part of super
clusters cˆx ∈ Cˆ to real world entities (e.g., BTCChina, Kraken, Xapo) which belong to
different business categories. Specifically, we gathered 359,776 deciphered addresses from
Walletexplorer (2015) and Blockchain (2015b). According to their entity information, we




Precisely, pγ = {a | a belong to the known beneficial owner γ} is the set of addresses that
belong to the beneficial owner γ whose identity is publicly available from the Internet.11
11For example, pHuobi is the set of addresses associated to Huobi with n(pHuobi) = 37, 756.
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Figure 1: Network visualization of the interactions of the super clusters in Cˆ with each other and
also with all the remaining clusters in C \ Cˆ. Every red node represents a single super cluster cˆx ∈ Cˆ
and every grey node represents a counterpart cluster. For visualization purposes, we set a threshold of
at least 1,000 BTC transferred between a super cluster and its counterpart. Therefore, the plot shows
1,957 super clusters out of 2,850 in Cˆ. One may observe that some of the clusters are highly connected
to each other, although many are isolated. These isolated entities could be individuals, some highly
self-contained businesses, or some clusters that belong to active business entities but which are kept
untied from the others, i.e., used independently for purposes different from the main business activity.
Thus, depending on whether a super cluster hold at least one address belonging to
any pγ ∈ P or not, Cˆ is then decomposed into either a known group, CˆK , or a unknown
group, CˆU . Formally,
Cˆ = CˆK ∪ CˆU (2)
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pγ 6= ∅ ∧ cˆx
⋂





pγ 6= ∅ ∧ cˆx
⋂
(P \ pγ) 6= ∅ ,∀γ ∈ Γ
cˆx
⋂
pγ = ∅ ,∀γ ∈ Γ.
(3)
The matching exercise turns out the following result: n(CˆK)=209 and n(CˆU)=2,641 such
that n(CˆK) + n(CˆU) = n(Cˆ)= 2,850.12 As a side note, we remark that Equation (3)
follows a prudential principle that aims to avoid false positives. Namely, any cluster in
Cˆ that has addresses linked to more than one set pγ ∈ P , is considered unknown and
confined to the set CˆU .13
Then, according to their business model, each identified super cluster is allocated into
one of the following primary business categories: exchange CˆKX , mining pool CˆKP , online
gambling CˆKG, black market, CˆKB. Besides these big four business categories which are
populated by economic entities with a clear business profile, there are also few other
economic entities with a business models (e.g., bitcoin wallets) heterogeneous among
them and disparate from the previous ones. Then, we classify them into the category
others, CˆKO.
Table 8 in the Appendix B shows us the results, namely, n(CˆKX) = 104, n(CˆKP ) = 18,
n(CˆKG) = 45, n(CˆKB) = 13 and n(CˆKO) = 29 such that n(CˆKX) + n(CˆKP ) + n(CˆKG) +
n(CˆKB) + n(CˆKO) = n(CˆK) = 209.
12See Figure 15 in Appendix A for a visualization of the problem we aim at solving.
13As an example, one of the biggest clusters holding about 6 million addresses which probably should
have been included in CˆK is instead included in CˆU because although it has 2 million addresses linked








































































































































Figure 2: Network visualization of the 209 super clusters in the set CˆK that have been identified by
cross linking the known addresses in the set P with the addresses in each cˆx ∈ Cˆ. As it happens that
more than one super cluster may belong to single entities in Γ, we combine them into one node in the
network. For visualization purposes, we set a threshold of at least 5,000 BTC being transferred between
a super cluster cˆx ∈ Cˆ and its counterpart. Therefore, the plot shows only 94 super clusters out of 209
in CˆK . The grey nodes are the counterparts of each cˆx ∈ Cˆ. Each super cluster is colored according to
its business category: green for miners, red for exchange, blue for gambling, orange for others, black for
black market, purple for composite category, and grey for the clusters which are the counterparts. The
color of the edge is the same as the source nodes. One may clearly observe some large entities with many
counterparts, such as Silkroad (black market), SatoshiDice (online gambling), BitStamp (exchange) and
BTC-e (exchange).
Figure 2 shows the payment network of the 209 identified super clusters14 in CˆK . In
the next sections, we will use the information on the super clusters in the set CˆK together
with the information on their interactions with all the other clusters in C \ CˆK to derive
14Super clusters linked to the same real world entity are merged into one node in the network.
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the business membership of each unknown super cluster in CˆU .
4 Pure User Group Analysis
The pure user group (PUG) analysis is carried out to classify (into specific business
categories) super clusters in the unknown group and it is based on the definition and
classification of “pure” users. By pure users we mean all those clusters populating the
Bitcoin economy (except for those already in the known group) that had bilateral trans-
actions with super clusters (in the known group) belonging to only one business category.
In other words, for each specific business category we build a correspondent PUG:
1) clusters having transactions only with exchanges in CˆKX are classified in the PUG
traders ; 2) clusters having transactions only with gambling services in CˆKG are classified
in the PUG gamblers ; and 3) clusters having transactions only with black market services
in CˆKB are classified in the PUG black market user-dealers.
The classification of the clusters into different pure user groups is the first step of
the PUG analysis. The second step consists of classifying the super clusters in the un-
known group into a specific business category in the case they transact only with the
corresponding specific PUG. For example, those super clusters in the unknown group
that had transactions only with traders are classified as exchanges and so on also for the
other categories. However, the clusters in the known group identified in the categories
mining pools and others follow a peculiar business model. Thus, we do not create the set
of PUGs having transactions only with mining pools in CˆKP because the mining pools
in the unknown group will be identified via the coinbase analysis (see Section 4.2). Sim-
ilarly, we do not create the set of PUGs having transactions only with others in CˆKO
because those clusters do not have a clearly defined business profile. In other terms, to




In this first part of the analysis we consider only the following sets CˆKX , CˆKG and CˆKB.
Accordingly, we introduce the following set notation: UX ⊂ C \ CˆK is the subset of pure
traders that had transactions only with exchanges in CˆKX ; UG ⊂ C \ CˆK is the subset
of pure gamblers that had transactions only with gambling sites in CˆKG; UB ⊂ C \ CˆK
is the subset of pure black market user-dealers that had transactions only with black
markets in CˆKB. Formally:
UX = {cx ∈ C \ CˆK | ∃cˆy ∈ CˆKX :
(
wxy(cx, cˆy) > 0 ∨ wyx(cˆy, cx) > 0
)
∧ (wxj(cx, cj) = 0 ∨ wjx(cj, cx) = 0) ,∀cj ∈ CˆK \ CˆKX}. (4)
UG = {cx ∈ C \ CˆK | ∃cˆy ∈ CˆKG :
(
wxy(cx, cˆy) > 0 ∨ wyx(cˆy, cx) > 0
)
∧ (wxj(cx, cj) = 0 ∨ wjx(cj, cx) = 0) ,∀cj ∈ CˆK \ CˆKG}. (5)
UB = {cx ∈ C \ CˆK | ∃cˆy ∈ CˆKB :
(
wxy(cx, cˆy) > 0 ∨ wyx(cˆy, cx) > 0
)
∧ (wxj(cx, cj) = 0 ∨ wjx(cj, cx) = 0) ,∀cj ∈ CˆK \ CˆKB}. (6)
This first part of the PUG analysis returns the following results: n(UX) = 440, 434,
n(UG) = 415, 528 and n(UB) = 74, 233.
The statistics of the bitcoin transactions between pure users and clusters in the known
group reveal that the average volume per transaction differs substantially with respect
to each business category: The average volume per transaction from/to traders to/from
exchanges is 20 BTC; the average volume per transaction from/to gamblers to/from
gambling services is 0.5 BTC; and finally, the average volume per transaction from/to
user-dealers to/from black market services is 3 BTC (see Table 3).
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Statistics for PUG Transaction
PUG → CˆK CˆK → PUG










UX 440,434 23.4 20,529.5 17.6 10,685.0
UG 415,528 0.5 528.3 0.5 387.3
UB 74,233 2.7 22,151.3 3.4 9,394.0
Table 3: For PUG in different categories, the table summarizes the average transaction amount(BTC)
and average transaction interval(minutes).
4.2 Identifcation of Mining Pools
The super clusters in the category mining pool are identified without utilizing the PUG
analysis. Indeed, each newly generated Bitcoin block includes a reward to the successful
miner: an amount equal to the sum of the block reward (or subsidy), i.e. newly available
bitcoins, plus any accumulated fees paid by transactions included in that block. To allo-
cate this sum, a new generation transaction is created whose input, called the “coinbase”,
contains the reward for the miners. Thus, unlike all other transaction inputs, the coinbase
is not linked to any previous output. This feature offers a simple and direct method to
identify those clusters belonging to the mining category by filtering out the transactions
with “null” input and only one output.
Let CˆUCoinbase be the set of clusters (in the unknown group) composed (also, but not
only) of addresses with coinbase inputs, n(CˆUCoinbase) = 575. Not all these 575 clusters,
however, can reliably be defined as mining pools; for some of them, mining is not their
primary activity and rewards from coinbase transactions represent only a small percent
of their activity. To make sure that the taxonomy is robust, we classify only clusters in
the unknown group whose mining rewards occupy more than 80% of its total income,
as mining pool, CˆUP . The remaining clusters CˆUP¯ = CˆUCoinbase \ CˆUP that cannot be
defined as mining pools according to our threshold are instead classified via the PUG
analysis.
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4.3 Classification of Unknown Super Clusters
The principle of PUG classification for unknown clusters is straightforward and works
as follows: If one super cluster in the unknown group transacts only with one specific
PUG, then we suspect that this cluster belongs to the business category correspondent to
that specific PUG. For example, if during the period January 2009 - May 2015 one super
cluster in CˆU records transactions with one or more traders in UX but not with gamblers
in UG and user-dealers in UB, it is classified as an exchange. One should note that this
does not rule out the possibility for the exchange to transact with any other cluster in C
beyond those in UX . The clusters who transact with multiple PUGs are identified in the
composite category, CˆUM , which implies those super clusters might have multi-business
lines.
Let
CˆUX¯ = {cˆx ∈ CˆU | ∃cy ∈ UX :
(
wyx(cy, cˆx) > 0 ∧ wxy(cˆx, cy) > 0
)} (7)
be a broad subset of exchanges in CˆU that have transactions not only with traders.
Let
CˆUG¯ = {cˆx ∈ CˆU | ∃cy ∈ UG :
(
wyx(cy, cˆx) > 0 ∧ wxy(cˆx, cy) > 0
)} (8)
be a broad subset of gambling services in CˆU that have transactions not only with gam-
blers.
Let
CˆUB¯ = {cˆx ∈ CˆU | ∃cy ∈ UB :
(
wyx(cy, cˆx) > 0 ∧ wxy(cˆx, cy) > 0
)} (9)
be a broad subset of black market services in CˆU that have transactions not only with
user-dealers.
Then, the subset of exchanges in CˆU that have transactions only with traders in UX
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is:
CˆUX = {cˆx ∈ CˆUX¯ \ (CˆUG¯ ∪ CˆUB¯ ∪ CˆUP¯ )}. (10)
Similarly, the subset of gambling services in CˆU that have transactions only with gamblers
in UG is:
CˆUG = {cˆx ∈ CˆUG¯ \ (CˆUX¯ ∪ CˆUB¯ ∪ CˆUP¯ )}. (11)
The subset of black market services in CˆU that have transactions only with user-dealers
in UB is:
CˆUB = {cˆx ∈ CˆUB¯ \ (CˆUX¯ ∪ CˆUG¯ ∪ CˆUP¯ )}. (12)
Finally, the subset of multi-business clusters in CˆU that have transactions with more
than one user group is:
CˆUM = {cˆx ∈
(
(CˆUX¯ ∪ CˆUB¯ ∪ CˆUG¯ ∪ CˆUP¯ ) \ (CˆUX ∪ CˆUG ∪ CˆUB ∪ CˆUP ))}. (13)
Table 4 shows that n(CˆUX) = 310, CˆUG = 755, CˆUB = 41, CˆUP = 57 and CˆUM = 630.
Tagged Cluster in Unknown Group






Table 4: The number of clusters tagged with the PUG method. To give the reader a complete view,
CˆUP is also listed here, which is identified from coinbase transactions.
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5 Transaction Pattern Analysis
In this section we introduce a transaction pattern (TP) analysis to study the different
transaction patterns of the super clusters in set CˆK (listed in Table 8). The TP analysis
is used to garner more insights into stylized facts characterizing the distinct business
behaviors of the super clusters. Moreover, the TP analysis is used in Section 6 to measure
the accuracy of the PUG analysis by testing the pattern similarity between the clusters
in CˆK and those in CˆU . In the following we divide the TP analysis in inflow and outflow
analysis.
5.1 Inflow Analysis
The inflow analysis consists of examining the properties of the transactions toward any
super clusters in the known group CˆK . We select the transactions in the set:
−→
WK ⊂ W = {wyx(cy, cˆx) ∈ W | cy ∈ C \ CˆK , cˆx ∈ CˆK , nyx ≥ 100} (14)
where nyx denotes the number of transactions from cluster cy to cluster cˆx during the
period of the analysis. According to Equation (14), a pair (cy, cˆx) ∈ −→WK is only considered
if there has been at least 100 transactions from cy to cˆx. This minimum transaction
threshold is subjective and shall be set to any value able to ensure that the descriptive
statistics calculated are robust. In our case, with nyx ≥ 100 we obtain that n(−→WK) =
11, 899, involving 148 super clusters in CˆK . After having defined the set of analysis, we
calculate the median of transaction volume and the mediam of time interval in minutes
for each pair (cy, cˆx) ∈ −→WK .15 Each dot in Figure 3 represents the measurement for one
pair (cy, cˆx) ∈ −→WK : red if cˆx ∈ CˆKX , green if cˆx ∈ CˆKP , blue if cˆx ∈ CˆKG, and black
if cˆx ∈ CˆKB. The x- axis is the median of the transaction volume and the y-axis is
the median of the time interval (in minutes) between inflow transactions for each pair
15For example, if the median value of intervals is 60 minutes, this means that counterparts tends to
send to cˆx bitcoins every 60 minutes.
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(cy, cˆx) ∈ −→WK .
Figure 3 shows some clustering effects; we can see that for each of our four identified
business categories there exists specific patterns of transaction behavior. For example,
there are clearly plotted in blue, vertical lines at x=0.01, 0.02 and so on. To capture
this more clearly, we plot the kernel density in Figure 4.16 This illustrates a notable
characteristic for gambling behavior, that is gamblers tend to place bets with similar,
round lot amounts (i.e. 0.1, 0.5, 1.0, etc.) again and again, with wagers of 0.01 BTC being
placed most frequently. Gamblers may be accustomed to wagering in round amounts in
traditional settings using casino or poker chips with specified round values (e.g., $1, $5,
or $25), or online using virtual chips. Individuals may carry forward that behavior to
bitcoin-based gambling even in instances where the size of bets are determined arbitrarily
by the gambler placing bets.17
With respect to exchanges, although it is less obvious due to some overlap in the plot,
we are still able to see some vertical lines in red at x=0.1, 0.5, and 1.0, which indicates
that the traders usually deposit into exchanges round amounts of bitcoins, rather than
random amounts in order to presumably exchange them for fiat or alternative digital
currency. In other words, it appears that traders may wait until they have accumulated
some even amount, most commonly 1.0 BTC, before selling them.
Inflows to black markets show a wider variety of arbitrary transaction size, but still
also show marked preference for round lots of bitcoin, notably at amounts of 0.1, 0.2,
0.3, 0.5, and 1.0 BTC. This may suggest that black market sellers explicitly place round
lot prices on their items as a matter of doing business. Prescription and illegal drugs
are notably sold on black markets, and this indicates that sellers will offer an amount of
contraband that corresponds to a round price (say, 1.0 BTC), rather than determining
what the price would be for a fixed quantity (say, for 1 ounce).18
16In order to capture exact density on point, a very precise width is needed. In this case, we set the
width 0.00000001 BTC (or 1 satoshi).
17This is true, for example, in SatoshiDice, the largest bitcoin-based gambling service.
18This practice is common in transactions involving small amounts of street drugs where a ”dime bag”
is whatever quantity $10 buys and a ”nickel bag” whatever $5 buys.
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Mining pools exhibit a more or less random pattern of inflows, since a mining pool will
only be credited with small amounts of bitcoin whenever it finds a new block of bitcoin.
When this happens, the pool will generally extract a small profit consisting of either a
nominal percentage of the block reward, or of the transaction fees associated with that
block, or both.
In addition to studying patterns in the amounts of bitcoin inflows, we also consider
transaction intervals. We observe a large density of dots, plotted in red, clustering hori-
zontally just above y=1,000 in Figure 3, specifically at 1,440 minutes, which is the number
of minutes in one day. What this shows us is that there are a large number of traders who
send small amounts of bitcoins to exchanges regularly each day. We suspect that these
could be small miners who exchange mined bitcoins for cash on a daily basis, or “day
traders” who are active daily but go home flat, having sold out any positions in bitcoin to
avoid overnight price volatility. Figure 5 clarifies this effect, and shows the kernel density
of the intervals between transactions (band=100 minutes). The 1,440 minute interval is
prominent not only for traders to exchanges but also for the other business categories,
suggesting that a “one-day” holding period for bitcoin transactions is somewhat typical;
a one-day effect where traders, gamblers, black market participants, and miners tend to
cash out on a daily basis.
We observe however, that gambling has, by far, the shortest interval as well as the
highest transaction frequency. This is not difficult to understand, as gamblers can ante
or re-bet many times in a matter of minutes.
21




























Figure 3: Inflow transaction pattern for the known group. Each dot characterizes one pair of clusters
(cy, cˆx) ∈ −→WK . The x-axis is the median transaction volume of all transactions between all the pairs
of clusters ∈ −→WK during the period January 2009 – May 2015. The y-axis is the median transaction
interval (in minutes) of the transactions between all the pairs of clusters ∈ −→WK .
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Figure 4: Kernel density of the inflow amount of bitcoins received by any cy ∈ C \ CˆK during the
period January 2009 – May 2015 by each cluster cˆx ∈ Cˆk in the known group.
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Figure 5: Kernel density of the inflow transaction intervals between subsequent transactions during
the period January 2009 – May 2015 for each category in the known group.
5.2 Outflow Analysis
The outflow analysis consists of examining the properties of the transactions from the
clusters in the known group CˆK . As for the inflow analysis we measure the median
of transaction volume and the mediam of time interval in minutes. Additionally, we
measure the mediam number of inputs and outputs in the transactions between each pair
of clusters. To examine the transaction outflow from the super clusters cˆx ∈ CˆK , we
select the transactions in the set:
←−
WK ⊂ W = {wxy(cˆx, cy) ∈ W | cˆx ∈ CˆK , cy ∈ C \ CˆK , nxy ≥ 100} (15)
where nxy denotes the number of transactions from cluster cˆx to cluster cy during the
period of the analysis. According to Equation (15), a pair (cˆx, cy) ∈ ←−WK is considered
only if there has been at least 100 transactions from cˆx to cy. From our database we obtain
that n(
←−
WK) = 16, 188, involving 148 super clusters in CˆK . To extract information about
the number of inputs/outputs of the transactions in
←−
WK , we plot the median number
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of inputs/outputs in all the transactions between each pair (cˆx, cy) ∈ ←−WK . Each dot in
in Figure 6 represents a value set for pair (cˆx, cy, ) ∈ ←−WK : red if cˆx ∈ CˆKX , green if
cˆx ∈ CˆKP , blue if cˆx ∈ CˆKG, and black if cˆx ∈ CˆKB. The x-axis represents the median
number of inputs, and the y-axis represents the median number of outputs.
Only the mining pools show a significantly distinct transaction pattern from the oth-
ers. Specifically, the outflow transactions for most of the mining pools are characterized
by no more than ten inputs, but at the same time by a large amount of outputs, ranging
from tens to thousands. This is consistent with the business model of mining pools: After
successfully mining bitcoins, the mining pools will distribute the reward to all the small
miners who have contributed some mining effort. So, the number of outputs is much
larger than the number of inputs. One could speculate on the size of these mining pools
according to the number of outputs in each outflow transaction.
As done for the inflow analysis, for each pair (cˆx, cy, ) ∈ ←−WK , we calculate the median
transaction volume and the median time interval in minutes. The x-axis in Figure 7
represents the median transaction volume for each pair (cˆx, cy, ) ∈ ←−WK , while the y-axis
represents the median time interval (in minutes) between outflow transactions for each
pair (cˆx, cy, ) ∈ ←−WK . The blue dots scattered around the bottom-left area of the plot imply
that gambling clusters send relatively small amounts of bitcoin but at a high-frequency
to their counterparts.19
The outflow transaction interval is plotted in Figure 8, which also shows the one-
day effect for mining pools. The combination of the results from Figures 5 and 8 reveal
a clear stylized fact characterized by many small miners receiving daily rewards from
mining pools and then exchanging those rewards for fiat currency on exchange platforms.




























Figure 6: Mediam number of inputs and outputs for all the transactions among each pair (cˆx, cy) ∈ ←−WK
during the period January 2009 – May 2015. Each dot characterizes one pair of clusters. The x-axis
measures the median number of inputs and the y-axis measures the median number of outputs.




























Figure 7: Outflow transaction pattern for the known group. Each dot characterizes one pair of clusters
(cˆx, cy) ∈ ←−WK . The x-axis is the median transaction volume of all transactions between all the pairs
of clusters ∈ ←−WK during the period January 2009 – May 2015. The y-axis is the median transaction
interval (in minutes) of the transactions between all the pairs of clusters ∈ ←−WK .
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Figure 8: Kernel density of the outflow amount of bitcoins sent to any cy ∈ C \ CˆK during the period
January 2009 – May 2015 by each cluster cˆx ∈ Cˆk in the known group.
6 PUG Control Test with TP Analysis
In this section, we test the results of the PUG classification conducted in Section 4 for
clusters in the unknown group by analyzing whether they exhibit pattern similarities
with the clusters in the known group. The test is twofold and is based on the translation
in matrix form of the inflow transaction patterns and the outflow transaction patterns
involving super clusters in the known group. Each matrix is then compared, via a 2-
D correlation20 analysis, with the correspondent one related to the inflow and outflow
transaction patterns involving super clusters in the unknown group.
To start, we translate the patterns depicted in Figure 3 into a matrix of transaction
volumes and time intervals for all cluster pairs (cy, cˆx) ∈ −→WK with cˆx ∈ CˆK . We then
create a matrix of transaction volumes and time intervals for all cluster pairs (cy, cˆx) ∈ −→WU
with cˆx ∈ CˆU where:
−→
WU ⊂ W = {wyx(cy, cˆx) ∈ W | cy ∈ C \ CˆU , cˆx ∈ CˆU , nyx ≥ 100} (16)
20For deeper insight into the detail algorithm please see Barton et al. (1992).
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which means that a pair (cy, cˆx) ∈ −→WU is considered only if there has been at least 100
transactions from cy to cˆx. For each pair (cy, cˆx) ∈ −→WU we calculate the median transac-
tion volume and the median of time interval (in minutes) between inflow transactions.
Let
−→
WKX ⊂ −→WK , −→WKG ⊂ −→WK , −→WKB ⊂ −→WK be the subsets of inflow transactions
towards exchanges, gambling, and black markets in the known group, respectively. Sim-
ilarly, let
−→
WUX ⊂ −→WU , −→WUG ⊂ −→WU , −→WUB ⊂ −→WU be the subsets of inflow transactions
towards exchanges, gambling, and black markets in the unknown group, respectively.
Then, the 2-D correlations of the inflow transaction patterns between super clusters





WUX) is the 2-D correlation between the inflow transaction patterns
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WUB) is the 2-D correlation between the inflow transaction
patterns for the black markets in the known and unknown groups.
The correlation matrix in Table 5 shows that the classification of the super clusters
according to the PUG analysis is consistent with the results of the TP analysis because






















































WKX 0.8183 0.2240 0.5090
−→
WKG -0.0412 0.8943 -0.0100
−→
WKB 0.6615 0.0389 0.6665
Table 5: Correlation of category transaction(inflow) pattern between the known group and unknown
group.
Finally, by following a reverse approach than the one adopted to build the 2-D cor-
relation matrix for the inflow transaction patterns, we calculate also the 2-D correlation
between pairs of outflow transactions involving clusters in the known and unknown group.
Table 6 shows that also in this case the classification of the super clusters according to the
PUG analysis is consistent with the results of the TP analysis because the correlations
along the main diagonal are greater than the values off-diagonal.








WUX 0.4984 -0.0864 0.3599
←−
WUG 0.0378 0.5933 -0.0705
←−
WUB 0.4260 -0.0632 0.4509
Table 6: Correlation of category transaction(outflow) pattern between the known group and unknown
group.
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7 The Bitcoin Network
From the PUG analysis, we are able to classify some unknown super clusters into specific
business categories. To illustrate the result, Figure 9 plots the payment network between
the super clusters in Cˆ and their counterparts. For the sake of visualisation pourpose,
two thresholds are set for plotting: First, we only plot for transactions (edges) with a
volume larger than 1,000 BTC; second, the degree of the nodes must be larger than 2.
Figure 10 is a matrix of transactions between those super clusters in Cˆ ascribed to
the major business categories (exchange, mining pool, online gambling, black market and
composite). The y-axis depicts the sending clusters (grouped by business category) and
the x-axis depicts the receiving clusters (also grouped by business category). There is no
transaction volume limit for plotting this matrix; a dot is plotted as long as a y-axis super
cluster has ever sent (even once) bitcoins to an x-axis super cluster, no matter what the
transaction volume is. All the dots are colored according to the category to which the
source belong to. For example, all the transactions sent from exchanges are signified by
red dots.
We observe that mining pools typically only send coins to other categories, and do
not receive any. We also observe that black markets tend to interact most with exchanges
and composite services. A more comprehensive analysis of the results shown in Figure
10 is offered by the inflow dependency matrix in Table 7. Table 7 (A) lists the bilateral
transaction volume between all the pairs of business categories. The number in the cell
(i, j) is the amount category i sent to j. For example, cell(6,1) = 6,003,342.66 tells us the
category traders sent around six million bitcoins to exchanges. Table 7 (B) calculates, for
a given category, the percentage of bitcoins received from other categories. For example,


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 9: Payment network between super clusters in Cˆ and their counterparts. An edge is traced
as long as one party of the transaction belongs to our sample group. All clusters are colored according
to the categories we explored. For clearer visualization, two thresholds are set here: First, transaction
volume between each pair of nodes must be larger than 1,000 BTC. Second, the nodes’ degree must be
larger than 2.
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EX MP OG BM CO
Figure 10: Transaction matrix between super clusters in different business groups: “EX” for exchange,
“MP” for mining pool, “OG” for online gambling, “BM” for black market, “CO” for composite. The
y-axis depicts the sending clusters (grouped by business category) and the x-axis depicts the receiving
clusters (also grouped by business category). A dot is plotted if during the period January 2009 – May
2015 a y-axis cluster has ever sent bitcoins to an x-axis cluster, no matter what the transaction volume
is. All the dots are colored according to the category of source clusters, which is in line with the color
rule used in Figure 9.
7.1 Evolution of the Bitcoin Economy
Using the above analysis, we can measure the relative prevalence of each general business
category (i.e. mining pool, exchange, online gambling, and black market) in our sam-
ple, and track their evolution over the study period and visualize shifts in their relative




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 11: Stacked plot of the inflow income amount for each business category in our sample (i.e., sum
of the bitcoin inflows across all the super clusters in Cˆ belonging to the same major business category)
over the Bitcoin network, monthly from January 2009 through May 2015.
We identify three distinguishable regimes that have occurred in the Bitcoin economy
since its inception. The first period runs from approximately January 2009 through
March 2012. This “proof-of-concept” period is characterized largely by test transactions
among a small number of users, and with very little meaningful commercial activity.21
Our analysis shows that this initial period is dominated almost entirely by mining, which
is what we’d expect from a system still devoid of material economic activity.
Next, from approximately April 2012 through October 2013 a second period consisting
of ”early adopters” appears. This period is characterized by a sudden influx of gambling
services and ”darknet” black markets; due to the overwhelming prevalence of these ar-
guably nefarious categories, another name for this phase could be the period of ”sin.”
These types of businesses initially responded to the unique features of Bitcoin such as
its relative anonymity (pseudonimty), lack of regulatory and legal oversight, borderless
transactions, and low transaction costs absent from taxation. This new form of secure
digital cash was ideal for the purchase and sale of illicit drugs, stolen items, and other
contraband that could not be easily traded elsewhere online, or for gambling from a lo-
21One notable exception is on the 22nd May 2010 in a purchase made by Laszlo Hanyecz, a software
developer who paid a fellow BitcoinTalk online forum user 10,000 BTC for two Papa John’s pizzas. At
today’s prices that is the equivalent of $2.25 million per pizza!
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cation where such a practice would be prohibited. Often, users of these “sin” sites would
mask their internet traffic via services such as a virtual private network (VPN) or via the
TOR network, encouraging usage growth where the probability of being caught would be
minimal (Dingledine, 2004). In fact, our data show that in January of 2013, gambling
and black markets together accounted for fully 51% of all transactional inflows on the
Bitcoin blockchain (in our sample). Figure 12 shows the relative percentage of inflow
transactions for each business category from January 2009 through May 2015.













Figure 12: Stacked plot of the relative income for each business categories as a percentage of total
income inflows, monthly from January 2009 through May 2015. Mining dominates initially, then “sin”
categories (gambling in blue and black markets in black) rise, but recede over time in favor of exchanges.
The largest black market at the time was the Silk Road (see Figure 9). That service
was famously raided and shut down by the FBI in October of 2013, which could help
explain the sudden drop in black market activity that brought this period to a close,
although this event cannot satisfactorily explain the concurrent drop in gambling activity.
The drop in gambling as a percentage of overall bitcoin transactions may have been due
instead to the increase in value of one bitcoin, from a few tens of dollars to a few hundreds
of dollars. If a gambler tends to bet one hundred dollars per day, what used to translate
into dozens of bitcoins steadily became fractions of one bitcoin. Indeed, even though the
relative amount of gambling has declined, the absolute amount wagered in dollar terms
has risen modestly. Over one hundred active gambling services currently exist that use
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bitcoin.
It is also worth noting that while the overall amount of business being transacted
on “sin” entities has fallen quite significantly, the actual number of black market sites
available on the Bitcoin economy has grown, with at least four reboots of the Silk Road,
and no less than fifty other (now defunct) marketplaces established since January 2014.
There are still a dozen or more such marketplaces active at the time this paper is written
(Branwen, 2015).
By November 2013, the amount of inflows attributable to ”sin” entities had shrunk
significantly to just 3% or less of total transactions. This third period, which we are still
currently experiencing, is characterized by a maturation of the Bitcoin economy away
from “sin” enterprise and diversifying into legitimate payments, commerce and services.
This claim is moreover supported by the ascendancy of the centrality of exchanges in the
Bitcoin network. Figure 13 takes the sum of the monthly betweenness centralities of the
super clusters in each business category and it ranks them from January 2012 through
May 2015.22 Each cell is colored according to the category we have identified. Since
January 2014 we see red cells outnumber all the others in each column, which tells us
that exchanges are the center of transaction activity.
When a licit merchant or service provider enters the Bitcoin economy and accepts
bitcoin as payment, we expect that they will cash out on a steady basis in order to cover
business costs and to reduce exposure to bitcoin’s price volatility; in doing so they require
the regular use of exchanges. At the same time, investors and other users who see bitcoin
as a financial asset would increasingly require exchanges. It is also around this time
that external venture capital investment grew in support of Bitcoin-related start-ups and
infrastructure, further legitimizing it. According to Tasca (2015) startups in the Bitcoin
space raised almost $1 billion in three years (Q1 2012 – Q1 2015). In 2012, around
$2 million of VC money made its way to Bitcoin start-ups. In 2013 that number had
22For consistency we also check other centrality measures like weighted degree and closeness, but the
result does not change. We refer the reader to Hanneman and Riddle (2014) for more details on network
centrality measures.
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grown to $95 million, followed by $361.5 million in 2014 and more than half a billion
dollars in 2015. Mining pools have stayed out of the spotlight in terms of our analysis
of inflows and outflows. This should not understate the value of miners and their role
in the Bitcoin economy. Firstly, we would not expect mining pools to receive much in
the way of income as those joining pools will only extract bitcoins and not send any to
the pool. The pool generally earns income by taking a nominal percentage (1-2% or less)
of the block reward, and/or by taking in the transaction fees associated with a found
block. In terms of outflows, despite the amount of miners active on the network, the
rate of unit formation for new bitcoins remains fixed at one block every ten minutes. At
the beginning of our study period, the block reward was 50 BTC per block, from March
1, 2009 until November 28, 2012, so on any given day miners collectively produced just
7,200 BTC, a small fraction of total daily transaction volume. After November 28, 2012
and until approximately July 9th 2016, the block reward was reduced to 25 BTC, so that
only 3,600 BTC were produced by miners daily, on average. After July of 2016, the block
reward is again to be reduced by half to 12.5 BTC, or 1,800 BTC to be produced per day
through mining. Therefore, even if all participants of mining pools cashed out daily, their
contribution to the overall network of payments will always be very small, and in fact
decrease over time. At the same time, the mining system is the de facto “central bank”
of the Bitcoin economy, expanding the money supply and validating every transaction.
Without a robust and ”honest” segment of miners, the fidelity of all other payments
in the network would be suspect. In fact, a weak network of miners would leave the
Bitcoin economy prone to a so-called 51% attack, where a bad actor could begin to
censor transactions by controlling a majority of power that validates transactions. Even
though the relative centrality of miners is very small compared to the other business
categories, the value they confer on to the network may instead be manifest via the price
of bitcoin and miners’ profitability as described by Hayes (2016).
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Figure 13: Monthly evolution, from January 2012 through May 2015, of the sum of the (betweenness)
centrality measures across all the super clusters in Cˆ belonging to the same major business category in
the Bitcoin network.
8 Conclusions
As the Bitcoin economy grows in size and scope, it becomes important to understand
the key components and players in that system. However, this task has largely proven
cumbersome since many tens of millions of individual addresses exist, which are not obvi-
ously linked to any specific individual or business entity, simply representing nondescript
public keys in a public-private key pair.
In this paper we start by analysing a database composed of millions of individual
bitcoin addresses that we distill down to 2,850 super clusters, each comprised of more
than 100 addresses and having received at least 1,000 BTC from January, 2009 to May,
2015. A super cluster can be thought of as an approximation of a business entity in that
it describes a number of individual addresses that are owned or controlled collectively
by the same beneficial owner for some particular economic purpose. These important
clusters are, for the most part, initially unknown and uncategorized. However, we are
able to ascribe most of them to one of four specific business categories – mining pools,
exchanges, online gambling, and black markets – by mapping and analyzing the network
of payments among those and a smaller, known set of clusters. In particular, we achieve
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this using a Pure User Group (PUG) analysis that examines inflows and outflows to and
from each of these clusters as well as Transaction Pattern (TP) analysis to confirm those
findings. Our method of de-anonymizing otherwise pseudonymous clusters allows us to
not only visualize the Bitcoin network of payments but also to extract stylized facts that
describe its internal economy.
We find that there are, in fact, distinct patterns of transaction flows for each business
category. For example, flows between traders and exchanges average just around 20 BTC,
and traders buy or sell on average every 11 days. Meanwhile, gamblers wager just 0.5
BTC on average, but re-bet often within the same day. There seems to be a strong
preference to do business within the bitcoin economy in round lot amounts (e.g., 0.1, 0.2,
0.5, 1.0 BTC, etc.), whether it is traders exchanging for fiat money, gamblers placing
bets, or black market goods being bought and sold.
In terms of transaction interval, there is an observable one-day effect for each business
category. For instance, one stylized fact that emerges is that many small miners receive
mining rewards and may subsequently sell those rewards on exchanges daily. This is
interesting, as it could suggest most miners are operating for-profit and are not doing so
in order to accumulate and hoard bitcoins. Whether or not this effect has any bearing
on the price of bitcoin is open to further study. Transaction flows from miners in our
sample, however are relatively small compared to the rest of the Bitcoin economy since
miners in aggregate are only able to produce no more than either 3,600 or 7,200 BTC
per day, on average (with a block reward of either 25 or 50 BTC), as the Bitcoin protocol
enforces a controlled rate of new unit formation at one block every ten minutes.
We then trace the evolution of the prevalence of each business category over time, and
identify three distinguishable regimes that have existed over the lifespan of the Bitcoin
economy. First, a proof-of-concept phase made up largely of small test transactions and
dominated by mining, with little substantive economic activity. Next, a period of rapid
growth occurs as early adopters consisting mainly of “sin” enterprises (i.e. gambling
services and black markets) who flock to the unique attributes that a cryptocurrency
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typifies. In the third phase, “sin” enterprises are supplanted by legitimate merchants and
a proliferation of exchange activity as those businesses convert digital currency into fiat
to cover costs and avoid price volatility. We can thus refer to the first regime as the “proof
of concept” or “mining-dominated” phase, the second as the “sin” or “gambling/black
market-dominated” phase, and the third as the “maturation” or “exchange-dominated”
phase.
The result of this work is to show that the Bitcoin economy, rather than being a
fleeting and frivolous pursuit, has grown and matured over the few years that it has
been operational, with distinct patterns of behavior among its most influential entities
and participants. As the Bitcoin economy continues to expand and evolve, the type of
de-anonymization and analysis employed in this paper can be used to ascribe unknown
entrants to perhaps new, distinct business categories, as well as further update and re-
fine the network of payments. Moreover, the methodology can in general be extended
and applied to other cryptocurrency networks, for example to the Ethereum or Litecoin
blockchains.
To conclude, the outcome of our study provides a quantitative assessment of the sys-
temically important categories within the Bitcoin economy and their network of payment
relationships. This information and analysis can be relevant to a broad audience of in-
terested parties, including financial professionals, data scientists, and social scientists;
as well as to policymakers, regulators and risk management practitioners. Finally, our
results suggest that some recent concerns regarding the use of bitcoin for illegal transac-
tions at the present time might be overstated, and that whatever such transactions may











































































Figure 14: Structure of the MySQL database created from the data described in Table 1. We parse
the transaction data from the Bitcoin Core, and then we populate them into a MySQL database. Our
database carries all the data in ‘blk00000.dat’ files, from the 1st of Jan 2009 to the 7th of May 2015.
The skeleton of the database is composed of 5 tables: chain, tx, input, output and addresses. Except
for linkage between output and addresses, all the other linkage are 1:n relationship. Output and address
have m:n(m > 1, n > 1) relationship, as in case of multi-sig transactions, one output could contain
several addresses, and at the same time, one address could also be used to receive bitcoins from time to
time. 40
Total Bitcoin Network  
30 million clusters (including single-address clusters) 

Unknown group 
2,641 clusters to be ascribed to 
business entities 
Known group 
209 clusters identified by  
address-linking  
Figure 15: The total number of clusters in the Bitcoin network is about 30 million. Our research
focuses on 2,850 large clusters that include at least 100 addresses and that also have received at least
1,000 bitcoins from the 3rd of January 2009 to the 8th of May 2015 (Known Group + Unknown Group).
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B Tables
List of identified super clusters in the set CˆK
Exchange 24850005 CoinSpot 45437770 BitYes 9549829 BitMillions 25855276 Evolution
Cluster id Entity name 25671458 CoinTrader 45936035 Huobi 10352795 Betcoins 28893773 BlackBank
414294 VirWoX 25686021 Poloniex 46523945 CleverCoin 11592006 BTCOracle 32188483 CannabisRoad
725951 Cavirtex 25764718 LiteBit 47947669 BtcTrade 12554372 Coinroll 34450135 PandoraOpen
1152538 CampBX 26526196 AllCoin 48224085 BitVC 14592351 Just-Dice 39307422 MiddleEarth
1477742 MercadoBitcoin 26768188 VaultOfSatoshi 49491730 Coinmate 15935043 BIToomBa 53431789 Nucleus
1538322 BTCChina 27058962 MintPal 49497346 LocalBitcoins 17858445 YABTCL 58138309 Abraxas
1591210 Bitcash 27430132 C-Cex 51159703 Bter 18104553 BitZillions
1640270 BTC-e 27436957 Indacoin 52772381 ChBtc 18242583 Ice-Dice Others
1745068 Bitstamp 27516236 1Coin 63125407 BTCChina 18844372 SatoshiRoulette Cluster id Entity name
1872280 Bitcoin 27883925 Bittrex 64576584 Exmo 19074264 Peerbet 51591631 HaoBTC
2403973 TheRockTrading 28195895 Paymium 64714050 HitBtc 20709464 Betcoin 2481605 BitcoinFog
3160452 OrderBook 29314526 AllCrypt 67252210 Bter 21368294 AnoniBet 38948179 BitLaunder
3169372 BitBargain 29907632 Dgex 74399779 MtGox 22181037 NitrogenSports 17685858 CryptoLocker
5128017 LocalBitcoins 30131409 CoinMotion 22815568 CoinGaming 1400957 MPEx
5946497 HappyCoins 30139877 Bter Mining Pools 23210454 SatoshiBet 2062018 Bitcoinica
6299268 Cryptonit 30804162 CoinArch Cluster id Entity name 24545072 999Dice 3165186 Bitcoinica
6606601 MtGox 30852641 BTCChina 177451 Eligius 24857474 BitcoinVideoCasino 32965397 UpDown
6960785 Bitfinex 31778769 Coin-Swap 2400970 mining.bitcoin 26783278 PocketRocketsCasino 1406234 Btcst
7522909 Bitcoin-24 32344865 BitBay 2440660 BitMinter 28382823 BitAces 17144983 Purse
8058186 Justcoin 32394318 Bter 4886325 EclipseMC 32814149 BitStarz 21601241 Bylls
8764670 FYBSG 33419156 CoinCafe 5272039 GHash 33495508 Betcoin 14543862 Bitbond
11025414 BitX 34085743 BX 7530073 BTCGuild 37042731 CloudBet 36933042 BTCJam
11196419 SmenarnaBitcoin 34277949 BtcExchange 8388553 50BTC 38624871 PrimeDice 39317993 BitLendingClub
11749226 Cryptorush 35226292 MeXBT 11551066 50BTC 39363482 DiceNow 17815289 BTCt
12637441 McxNOW 35431781 Zyado 12547187 mining.bitcoin 41129839 DiceBitco 1075785 BitPay
12797521 Korbit 35636277 QuadrigaCX 13455133 KnCMiner 43427199 PrimeDice 16248472 CoinPayments
13228368 Vircurex 36674288 MaiCoin 18761724 CloudHashing 44125199 SatoshiMines 65645195 BitPay
13539065 Crypto-Trade 36837273 HitBtc 21224287 BTCChinaPool 45607266 FortuneJack 1582623 Bitmit
13549778 Cryptsy 37013580 Matbea 23855294 Polmine 48934666 SecondsTrade 13255854 CryptoStocks
14777694 Coins-e 37776533 Btc38 34581906 Genesis-Mining 50523669 Betcoin 454407 Instawallet
14833131 AnxPro 38951758 Ccedk 45656162 AntPool 52248120 SatoshiDice 869503 MyBitcoin
15004560 BitKonan 39963036 796 48150806 mining.bitcoin 57476416 BitcoinVideoCasino 8341192 Dagensia
16030982 OKCoin 40161739 LakeBTC 58048160 AntPool 58900551 PrimeDice 14011339 CoinJar
17494455 Huobi 41193900 Bitso 61166475 BW 64148592 BitAces 14359270 Xapo
17518823 CoinMkt 41323542 SpectroCoin 65420930 SwCPoker 14773742 Inputs
17747783 Kraken 41433875 OKCoin Gambling 73161189 PrimeDice 31631652 BitcoinWallet
18055670 Cex 41555907 BTC-e Cluster id Entity name 51620287 OkLink
18847146 BtcMarkets 41614840 BTC-e 184867 Just-Dice Black Market 59825409 GoCelery
19681395 Bitcoin 41923963 Hashnest 1687007 BetsOfBitco Cluster id Entity name
20789150 Coinomat 42369494 Cryptsy 2254800 SealsWithClubs 4401158 SilkRoad
21373812 Bleutrade 42879690 C-Cex 3486952 SatoshiDice 9563241 Sheep
21653414 Bitfinex 43277175 Bit-x 4169604 BitZino 19517829 PandoraOpen
23421684 Coin 43970673 Bter 4831753 BtcDice 20627442 SilkRoad2
23672561 Masterxchange 43974172 Bter 8339663 BitElfin 22735225 Agora
24089310 Igot 45333046 Bitcurex 9510403 Playt 22917766 BlueSky
Table 8: List of the super clusters in CˆK . One entity could own and control more than one cluster.
The cluster IDs are generated internally from MySQL database, and each cluster has one unique cluster
ID. Entities are classified according to their business objective. We focus on the biggest four categories
(exchange, mining pool, gambling, black market). Entities with exposure to more than one category,
such as HaoBTC (both wallet and mining pools) are categorized as “composite”.42
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